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The Demise of Procedural Protections in Laywitness
Identifications in Federal Court: Who is the Culprit?
JOHN F. DECKER*
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EDWARD ALBERT***
INTRODUCTION
Four days after the tenth anniversary of the United States Su-
preme Court's landmark enunciation of procedural protections in
laywitness criminal identification procedures,' the Court decided
Manson v. Brathwaite,2 indicating more emphatically than in any
intervening opinion its proclivity to abandon these protections.
The Supreme Court first directly confronted the troublesome
problem of identifying participants in criminal activity in 1967 in
United States v. Wade,3 Gilbert v. California,4 and Stovall v.
Denno.5 The Court, using the sixth and fourteenth amendments,6
sought to insure fairness and accuracy in the various identification
procedures utilized by law enforcement authorities by requiring the
presence of counsel7 and by demanding the unbiased administration
of such procedures.' While the rules created by this trilogy were by
no means unqualified, the Court in 1967 could not have anticipated
how subsequent opinions, including those of a later composition of
the Court itself,' would so effectively demonstrate how exceptions
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State's Attorney for Jo Daviess County. B.A., Loyola University of Chicago, 1971; J.D.,
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1. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
2. 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
3. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
4. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
5. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI and XIV, § 2.
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
8. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300.(1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U:S. 682 (1972).
Loyola University Law Journal
can consume the initial rules. As a result of this development, it is
imperative that lawyers understand not only the 1967 rules, but also
the subtleties which have been devised by the courts.
FORMS OF EYEWITNESS AND EARWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Law enforcement agencies may utilize one or more identification
procedures to determine whether a witness or victim of criminal
activity is able to identify the activity's participants. The lineup is
the best known pre-trial procedure, and the one preferred by the
courts.' " In a lineup, several individuals of similar physical, racial,
sexual, tonsorial, and cosmetic characteristics initially are placed in
a row facing the witnesses or victims. During the course of the
lineup, the individual may be asked to move or act in certain ways,
to put on or take off articles of clothing, or to speak certain words
in order that his or her voice might be heard, all of which is intended
to facilitate identification by the witnesses or victims.
Identification procedures need not be as structured as a formal
lineup. A witness or victim may have an opportunity to view several
individuals in a group display, such as by observing through a one-
way mirror several persons walking about, sitting, or standing in a
room." This method is useful to law enforcement agencies when it
is believed that the persons to be included in an identification pro-
cedure may not cooperate in a formal lineup.
The showup is another method of pre-trial identification involv-
ing personal confrontation, and the one perhaps least preferred by
the courts. 12 In a showup, one person is displayed to a witness or
victim of a crime. As with the lineup, the person may be asked to
move or act in certain ways, to put on or take off articles of clothing,
or to speak for purposes of voice identification.
Normally, pre-trial identification procedures involving personal
confrontation occur at a police station or jail facility. The practice
has also developed of having witnesses appear as part of the audi-
ence at a defendant's arraignment on other charges. 3 This may
10. See, e.g., United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cin), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841
(1976); United States v. Scott, 518 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1975) (although use of a less preferred
procedure is mitigated by defendant's uncooperativeness and representation by counsel);
United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d -1171 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)
(though not required, lineup preferred and recommended to prosecutors to avoid needless
argument).
11. See, e.g., Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933
(1974). But see Allen v. Moore, 453 F.2d 970 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972).
12. See, e.g., Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 518 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Martin v.
Donnelly, 391 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1974). A defendant might be viewed as well at a
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approximate a group display or a showup depending on how many
of the persons present resemble the witness' description. Of course,
this practice clearly cannot be compared with a lineup due to such
suggestive features as the witness' awareness of the identity of the
persons viewed, their status as defendants in the criminal justice
system, and the possibility that the witness may presume a connec-
tion with the criminal activity at issue because of that status.
A witness may also identify a person in a courtroom during testi-
mony under oath and subject to cross-examination. This procedure
is similar to a showup since the layout of the typical courtroom, with
the defendant and defense counsel at one table and the prosecutor
and investigating officer at another, is well known to most of the
American public. Here again bias is possible because a witness
might surmise that the law enforcement agencies possess evidence
that the person sitting next to defense counsel is the participant in
the criminal activity at issue from the very fact that he or she has
been brought to trial on the matter. This in-court identification
procedure may follow a pre-trial identification procedure at which
the witness may have viewed and identified the defendant as a
participant.
Personal confrontation is not required in pre-trial identifications.
A witness or victim of criminal activity may attempt to identify
participants through a photo display in which the witness is shown
a few or several hundred photographs of individuals of, hopefully,
similar characteristics, with the quality of the photographs display-
ing no noticeable differences or any indication of the identity or
status of the persons shown.
As with personal confrontations, a witness or victim of criminal
activity may see a single photograph for purposes of determining
whether the person shown in the picture was a participant in the
crime. This procedure is also viewed with disfavor by the courts due
to its inherent suggestiveness."
preliminary hearing such as to constitute an "out-of-court" identification procedure where
the witness views the defendant as part of the audience rather than as a witness under oath
at the hearing. See, e.g., Haberstroh v. Montanye, 362 F. Supp. 838 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,
493 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md.
1972).
14. See, e.g., Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975). Identification of participants
in criminal activity through visual observation is not the only method of identification for
evidentiary purposes. What has come to be known as "scientific evidence"-e.g., fingerprint
and spectrographic analysis, expert testimony on ballistic and paraffin tests, blood, skin, hair
and clothing fiber specimens, and other physical evidence of the crime-can all assist in
determining who the participants might be. However, all of these subjects are beyond the
scope of this article. See, e.g., J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1974).
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One other type of identification is non-expert earwitness identifi-
cation. The methods of earwitness identification include: listening
to the voices of persons involved in an eyewitness identification
procedure, whether arranged by the authorities or at an arraign-
ment; pre-trial listening to a tape recording of a sample of one or
more persons speaking certain words, or listening to such a sample
during testimony at trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
While recognizing the need for identification procedures, the
Court's attention has focused primarily upon their abuse. The 1967
trilogy provided two distinct constitutional grounds for attacking
identification procedures: (1) the absence of counsel at certain types
of lineups denied the defendant the opportunity for meaningful
cross-examination of witnesses and effective assistance at trial; 5
and (2) the identification procedure utilized was so unnecessarily
suggestive as to be conducive to an irreparably mistaken identifica-
tion and therefore violative of the defendant's right to due process
of law, regardless of the presence or absence of counsel. 6
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It is a well-established although perhaps questionable'7 principle
that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination" extends
only to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. While
15. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
16. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
17. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (Black, J., Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966). Though the distinction between this type of evidence and "non-
communicative" evidence may make sense in the context of physical features which are
public by nature, such as one's face or fingerprints, it becomes more difficult to justify when
potential defendants are required to write or speak certain words for purposes of determining
whether or not they have participated in criminal activity. Professor Leonard Levy, who has
brought his insightful writing abilities to bear on the meaning of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, has noted that the formulation of the words of that guarantee are
quite broad and protect "against more than just compulsory self-incrimination or even disclo-
sures merely tending to provide a link in a chain of.circumstantial evidence that might be
the basis of a prosecution." L. LEVY, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and
Judicial History, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUrbONAL HISTORY 265, 273 (L.
Levy ed, 1972). The fact that one's handwriting and voice may be exposed quite often by
personal choice in public should not affect the application of the right to disclosure of these
features. If such analysis were the guiding principle, a person could be interrogated without
the protection of the fifth amendment whenever offhand comments regarding a subject mat-
ter are repeated, for example in a newspaper, or when a person such as a public speaker
mentions a subject of interest to the authorities. That the person is, with regard to handwrit-
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compelling a person to disclose knowledge which he might possess
is thereby barred, forcing a person to exhibit physical characteris-
tics is not.20 Thus, with respect to the subjects under discussion
here, a person can be compelled to appear in a lineup,21 utter words
for identification purposes,2 2 or wear certain clothes in a lineup,2
3
without engendering fifth amendment violations.
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In United States v. Wade24 and Gilbert v. California,25 the Su-
preme Court extended to defendants, by way of the sixth amend-
ment,'2  a right to the presence of counsel at any in-court or out-of-
court identifications.27 The Court also held that testimony must be
per se excluded where it concerns a post-indictment out-of-court
identification made while counsel was absent.28 In so holding, the
Court indicated that no other considerations or factors prevent this
exclusion; the absence of counsel automatically taints the proce-
dure. 29 Thus, the Court noted it would be irrelevant that the witness
could have identified the defendant regardless of counsel's presence.
An objection to the absence of counsel at the out-of-court identifica-
ing or voice exemplars, not being required to disclose to the authorities specific
"communicative" information does not change the fact that the person is being required to
provide a link in the evidence which may be used against him by disclosing a physical feature
he may well be able to keep to himself otherwise. See generally Justice Marshall's excellent
and vigorous dissent in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) and United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 431-32 (1968).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Schneckloth, 425 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970).
22. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. See, e.g., United States v. King, 433 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
976 (1971). See also United States v. O'Neal, 349 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (defendant
forced to shave).
24. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
28. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
226-27 (1967).
29. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967): "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to
such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup."
Two doctrines have developed which make this per se designation questionable. Several
courts have found an "independent basis" for an in-court identification even though a Wade
or Gilbert violation occurred at a prior out-of-court identification. See, e.g., United States v.
Pigg, 471 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Singleton,
361 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Other courts have found such violations to be "harmless
error." See, e.g., Holland v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975).
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tion is deemed waived if not timely raised."' However, such admis-
sion of testimony may be held to be harmless error even if the
absence of counsel is properly noted and the testimony improperly
admitted.3 In fact, the vast number of affirmances based on
"harmless error" lead to the conclusion that the words "per se" in
this context have become meaningless. 2
The Wade Court indicated a denial of due process and of the right
to counsel33 occurs where the defendant does not have counsel at an
in-court identification and has not knowingly waived this right.34 In
this situation, evidence of the in-court identification should be ex-
cluded. Similarly, if the defendant had counsel present at the in-
court identification but not at an out-of-court identification prior to
trial, the former is not admissible unless it is based upon observa-
tions other than the out-of-court identification which had been
tainted by lack of counsel. 35 This "qualified" exclusionary rule arose
because mere suppression of the witness' testimony as to the out-
of-court identification was thought to be insufficient to eliminate
the effect that the tainted out-of-court identification would have in
crystallizing the witness' impressions 36 and influencing the in-court
identification. According to this rationale, it is clear that testimony
relating to an illegal out-of-court procedure cannot be cured by a
second out-of-court identification with counsel present. Therefore,
any such second lineup would be viewed under the same rules as a
subsequent in-court identification. 37
In 1967, the Supreme Court believed it necessary to extend the
protection of counsel to those faced with identification procedures
because "identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumer-
able dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even cru-
30. See, e.g., Guam v. Cruz, 415 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Cooper v. Picard, 428
F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970).
31. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 274 (1967), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Holland v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975);
United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970); Willard v. United States, 421
F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1970); Moore v. Oliver, 347 F. Supp. 1313
(W.D. Va. 1972), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1975). Contra, United States v. Gambrill, 449
F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Kimbrough v. Cox, 444 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1971).
33. See notes 81 through 88 infra and accompanying text.
34. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-41 (1967); Clemons v. United States, 408
F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
36. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 240 (1967). See also Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2261 (1977) (Marshall
& Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 439 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
930 (1971).
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cially, derogate from a fair trial.""5 Specifically, the Court was con-
cerned that "the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification,"3 that a "major factor contributing to the
high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification
has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which
the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identi-
fication."4" Furthermore, the Court noted it is "a matter of common
experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the
line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on,"'" and that
"the defense can seldom reconstruct the manner and mode of lineup
identification for judge or jury at trial.""2 Moreover, the prejudice
suffered at such identification procedures unduly compels defen-
dants to forego their fifth amendment rights and take the stand to
rebut the government's case.4" Of course, the problems which
prompted the Court to extend the guarantee of counsel are inherent
in all corporeal identifications, whether lineups or showups, both
before a formal charge has issued and after. Notwithstanding these
underlying reasons, a reconstituted, though perhaps less sensitive44
Supreme Court has subsequently held that certain identification
procedures are not subject to the Wade-Gilbert mandate.45
Prior to 1972, the federal courts of appeals disagreed regarding the
point at which right to counsel commences. The Supreme Court's
decision in Kirby v. Illinois6 settled the conflict. A plurality of the
Court held that the right attaches at the "initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings."47 Although one might logically as-
sume this occurs when a person is arrested, otherwise placed in
custody, or when a criminal complaint is filed,48 the Kirby Court
38. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 229, quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, 1963 CRIM. L.
REv. 479, 482.
42. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967).
43. Id. at 231.
44. See, e.g., L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 242-52
(1974).
45. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
46. Id.
-47. Id. at 689.
48. See, e.g., Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939
(1973), which, prior to Kirby, held the issuance of an arrest warrant to be the initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings. See United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). See also Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional
Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent? 72 MICH. L. REv. 719,
788 (1974) for an assertion that "a criminal prosecution commences at least with the prelimi-
nary arraignment when a formal complaint is filed in court against the accused."
19781
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considered only the filing of "formal charges" to constitute such a
commencement, i.e., an indictment, information, or whatever other
procedure is utilized to begin formal criminal proceedings within a
state."9 While ignoring the rationale of Wade and Gilbert, the Kirby
Court ostensibly adhered to precedent by noting that the defen-
dants in Wade and Gilbert had been indicted,50 even though this
fact does not appear to have been relevant to the Court's decisions
in 1967.
No Wade-Gilbert right to counsel attaches, therefore, at on-the-
scene" or accidenta5 2 confrontations occurring prior to the filing of
"formal charges." 53 Ironically, two short-term advantages result
from the Kirby holding's pressure on law enforcement agencies to
conduct identification procedures promptly after arrest if they are
to circumvent the requirements of the 1967 trilogy. First, expedi-
tious confrontations may produce more accurate identifications due
to the relatively fresh recollection of prospective witnesses. Second,
speedier releases of innocent persons from pre-trial detention may
result. Of course, a positive identification of a defendant as a partic-
ipant in criminal activity could produce a longer detention period,
which is problematic where the identification procedures are sugges-
tive in nature and that fact is concealed.
Right to Counsel at Other Personal and Non-Personal
Confrontations
The Wade Court recognized that the judicial system was author-
ized to
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the
49. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
50. Id. at 414.
51. See, e.g., Gomes v. New Jersey, 464 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Hines,
455 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972) and 406 U.S. 975 (1972); United
States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir. 1970); Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928
(1969). See also Allen v. Johnston, 413 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976) (confrontation outside courtroom not anticipated or arranged by prosecutor in any
way); Allen v. Moore, 453 F.2d 970 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972) (testimony of
chance meeting in street admitted); United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924 (1972) (a spontaneous confrontation outside of the hearing on the
motion to suppress evidence).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845
(1976); Robinson v. Alabama, 469 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
909 (1973); United States v. Bothwell, 465 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1972); Allen v. Johnston, 413 F.
Supp. 1 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.54
Thus, at first glance it appears that the strict rules regarding the
right to counsel at lineups might apply to other corporeal identifica-
tions occurring out of court. However, it has been held that no such
right exists at accidental,5" spontaneous,"6 or on-the-scene57 confron-
tations.
An identification for use in a criminal prosecution might be ar-
ranged by a private individual. For example, a confrontation might
take place in a retail store when the owner or agent apprehends a
suspected shoplifter and arranges for customers and employees to
verify that suspicion. In the absence of state action, the courts are
reluctant to require the presence of counsel at an identification
confrontation. This is undoubtedly the basis for the general con-
sensus that there is no right to counsel at accidental confronta-
tions.5"
Photographic displays have always been considered essential po-
lice investigative tools." They serve not only to identify the perpe-
trators of crime, but also to exonerate the innocent. In light of
Wade, a question arises as to the effect these procedures have on the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
The protections enunciated by Wade and Gilbert,"1 presumably
also relevant to photo identifications, were not extended to photo-
graphic situations by a 1973 Supreme Court decision. In United
States v. Ash,"2 a six justice majority held that there is no right to
54. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976); Allen v. Moore, 453 F.2d 970 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972); United
States v. Seader, 440 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971) (accidental encoun-
ter at the booking desk).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Colclough, 549 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924 (1972).
57. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
928 (1969). "While the language of Wade would thus seem to encompass prompt on-the-scene
identifications, they do not fall within the holdings of Wade or its companion case, Gilbert
v. California." Id. at 1283. See also United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 929 (1972) and 406 U.S. 975 (1972); United States v. Wilson, 435 F.2d 403
(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970); Solomon v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969). These decisions rest on the premise that the less time
there is between the crime and the viewing, the more reliable the ensuing identification
becomes.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Venere, 416 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1969).
59. See notes 52 & 55 supra.
60. See, e.g., C. O'HAR, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 600 (1970).
61. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
62. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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counsel at post-indictment photographic displays. The majority
indicated that a photographic identification was a "non-critical"
stage because defects may be remedied at trial; it was thus outside
the scope of Wade-Gilbert. This holding was based on the belief that
photographic displays are not trial-like confrontations and therefore
application of the sixth amendment right to counsel would be con-
trary to the amendment's historical purpose.a The display was
equated to the prosecution's right to interview witnesses, a right also
possessed by the defense counsel. 4
The Court did not consider why the Wade and Gilbert Courts
implicitly and necessarily rejected classifying identification proce-
dures as part of the prosecutor's "trial preparation." According to
the Ash majority, the right to counsel was designed to protect only
the defendant, and not witnesses, from falling into traps. 5 The fal-
lacy of this position lies in its implication that defendants have an
active role in identification procedures. The truth is that defendants
are passive participants-merely presenting their person for dis-
play. Had the Wade and Gilbert Courts accepted this premise of
active participation, the fifth amendment arguments would have
been viable.6
The focus of concern in Wade and Gilbert was in fact the relation-
ship between witnesses and authorities and the "traps" witnesses
might fall into due to suggestiveness. In eschewing the prophylactic
protections of Wade and Gilbert, the Ash Court substituted the
prosecutor's ethical obligation of fairness as a sufficient guard of
defendants' rights. 7 Yet, this rationale assumes that the prosecutor,
rather than the police, routinely confronts crime victims and wit-
nesses with photographic displays-a notion which hardly needs
refutation. Moreover, the Wade and Gilbert holdings implicitly re-
jected as inadequate protections reliance on the ethical compunc-
tions of law enforcement authorities in constructing fair corporeal
identification procedures.
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the Ash result, 8 presented an
opinion more consistent with the Wade rationale due to his under-
standing of photographic identification. He took the position that
"few possibilities for unfair suggestiveness" exist in such settings
because they could be effectively reconstructed at trial through the
63. Id. at 312-13, 317.
64. Id. at 317-18.
65. Id. at 317, quoting United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1969).
66. See notes 17 & 19 supra.
67. 413 U.S. 320.
68. Id. at 321.
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examination of the photos and witnesses, and any possible prejudi-
cial remarks' and implications would then become apparent. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Wade-Gilbert inquiry appears to be foreclosed in the
area of photographic identifications.
Whether the right to counsel is a necessity at laywitness voice
identification proceedings has not been the subject of an authorita-
tive statement. Although it is arguable that such an identification
is a critical stage, the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the right
to photo identifications appears to preclude such a holding.
In considering non-personal identifications and pre-indictment
personal confrontations, the Court has refused to extend the afore-
mentioned exclusionary rules and has instead limited defendants'
safeguard to application of the Stovall v. Denno due process test,7 °
that is, problems which arise from such identifications are evalu-
ated in light of whether that particular confrontation was offensive
to due process. In essence, Wade and Gilbert have been narrowly
construed and applied. Though expansion of these rules can be
urged, the courts have been moving in the opposite direction.
Use of Substitute Counsel
The Wade Court explicitly declined to reach the question of
whether the presence of substitute counsel suffices where the notifi-
cation and presence of the suspect's own counsel would result in a
prejudicial delay to the prosecution.7 The presence of substitute
counsel, according to the Court, might eliminate the hazards ren-
dering post-indictment identification a critical stage requiring the
presence of the suspect's own counsel. 71
In deciding this issue, the various appellate courts balanced the
relative advantages and disadvantages of such a substitution. The
use of substitute counsel is advantageous in that such counsel are:
(1) likely to have particular expertise in the matter of lineups; (2)
more likely to know what information can and should be available
to counsel from police; (3) more aware of what techniques may
enhance reliability; and (4) in a better position to testify as to the
surrounding circumstances than the retained counsel.7 3
These factors may be mitigated by the considerable advantages
69. Id. at 324-25.
70. Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977) (a photographic identification); Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (police station showup); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968) (a photographic identification).
71. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
72. Id. at 237 n.27.
73. See United States v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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to the defendant of having his own counsel present at the identifica-
tion. The assigned or retained counsel may be more familiar with
the particular facts (such as previous identifications, efforts to ob-
tain identifications, and the conditions under which the eyewit-
nesses said they made their original observation) and better able to
ascertain any potential suggestiveness in the course of the identi-
fication. His presence may enhance the effectivness of cross-
examination of the eyewitness at trial, and the danger that counsel
might fail to devote the time necessary to interview properly the
substitute counsel would be avoided." Finally, since a substitute
counsel is likely to have participated in a number of lineups within
a relatively short period of time, defendant's counsel would preclude
the risk that the substitute counsel might have just a vague recollec-
tion of the lineup in question.7 5
Satisfaction of the requirement of counsel at identification proce-
dures by the use of substitute counsel may be heavily influenced by
the presence or absence of photographs of the lineup.7" In any event,
if the substitute counsel could not recall the particular identifica-
tion attempt in question, the combination of that counsel's notes
and trial testimony regarding his perceived function at a lineup has
been deemed sufficient to render the identification admissible even
though defendant's own counsel was not present." Once admitted,
the jury is to evaluate the weight to be given the identification
testimony in light of the counsel's difficulty in being able to chal-
lenge the testimony.
Wade has been interpreted to require substitute counsel to assist
defendant's counsel in preparing a challenge to the fairness of the
identification procedure and in cross-examining the witnesses who
were present at the procedure.7 8 Since the government is in charge
of the identification procedure, the prosecution is charged with the
duty of assuring that the observations and opinions of the substitute
74. See, e.g., United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970). See also United States
v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also United States
v. Holiday, 482 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Queen, 435 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (where a photograph
exists, courts are less likely to hold use of substitute counsel insufficient).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Randolph, 443 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Six months earlier
the same court had implied that the use of substitute counsel is to be limited. United States
v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v.
Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974). See also Wilson
v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); United States v. Valez,
431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970).
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counsel are transmitted to the accused's trial counsel. 79
Many jurisdictions have established a system where substitute
counsel can be summoned rapidly to view a lineup when defendant's
own counsel is not available. Where delay would not be prejudicial
to the defense, it is still arguable that Wade compels the use of
defendant's own counsel instead of a substitute. An interplay be-
tween Wade-Gilbert and Stovall inquiries arises here because
Stovall's correlation between reliability and lack of delay makes
almost any delay at least potentially prejudicial, 0 thus severely
limiting the utility of this Wade-Gilbert argument.
Waiver of Right to Counsel
Allowing an accused to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel is a long-accepted practice,8' and has been
held applicable to identification procedures."2 The accused must
know that he has such a right if he is to be able to relinquish it
intelligently. A mere recital of the Miranda warnings 3 does not
sufficiently enable the accused to assert or intelligently waive his
right to counsel at a lineup. 4 Hence, the accused should be told
specifically that: (1) he is going to be placed in a lineup; (2) he has
the right to the presence of counsel at the lineup; (3) a lawyer will
be appointed if he cannot afford one; and (4) a substitute counsel
79. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (failure of substitute
counsel to effectively assist is grounds for suppression); Marshall v. United States, 436 F.2d
155 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. See note 201 infra. In Stovall v. Denno, the last of the 1967 trilogy of cases, the Court
held the rules of Wade and Gilbert were to be applied only prospectively. 388 U.S. 293, 296-
301. This holding was grounded on the belief that retroactivity would seriously disrupt the
administration of criminal justice and that the possibility of unfairness without the presence
of counsel is not as great as in the situation where criminal rules of procedure are applied
retroactively. Id. at 298-301. Thus, a general Stovall due process test has been applied to
lineups and showups occurring prior to June 12, 1967. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Gibbs v.
Vincent, 524 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); Choice v. Brierley, 460 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1972); Sewell v. Cardwell,
454 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1972); Utsler v. Erickson, 440 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
956 (1971); United States v. Liquori, 438 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (see the appendix for a review
of cases dealing with retroactivity); Terry v. Peyton, 433 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1970); Levine v.
United States, 430 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); Hernandez v.
Schneckloth, 425 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970); Trask v. Robbins, 421 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1970).
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842
(1970); Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
83. Miranda warnings include the right to presence of counsel; the right to remain silent;
that anything said can be used against him; and, if indigent, that the accused can have
counsel appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
842 (1970).
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can be provided in any event,15 assuming such substitute is avail-
able to the jurisdiction.
It is the government's burden to establish that the accused has
intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel." The right
to counsel will be deemed waived when a waiver is signed and the
accused offers no evidence to contradict the government's conten-
tion that it was an uncoerced intentional relinquishment of a known
right, rather than the product of an impetuous act. 7 Notwithstand-
ing this presumption, failure to provide the necessary warnings may
be mitigated if the prosecution establishes, by clear and convincing
evidence, an independent basis for the waiver.8"
ROLE OF COUNSEL
The role of counsel during identification procedures is unclear.
Though Wade envisioned a positive posture, the Court enumerated
no explicit functions for counsel, except that he or she should
"assure that the accused's interests will be protected consistently
with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution." 8 Counsel's most
obvious function is to observe so that he or she can meaningfully
cross-examine the witness' in-court identification and testimony as
to an out-of-court identification. However, this may put the defense
counsel in the difficult position of having to testify and perhaps
thereby damaging his or her own case. 0 This possibility raises seri-
ous ethical considerations °' which may force the defense counsel to
withdraw."
Although defense counsel has no explicit authority at the lineup,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has suggested that the
defense counsel make recommendations to the police to make the
85. See, e.g., Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Moher, 445 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
842 (1970); Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
89. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). See Polsky, Uviller, Ziccardi &
Davis, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall
Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1968) (panel discussion).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Kennon, 447 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972).
91. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969), EC 5-9: "The roles of an advo-
cate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the
cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively. Id., DR 5-102(A): "If,
after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is
obvious that he . . .ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw
from the conduct of the trial .. "
92. See, e.g., United States v. Gholston, 437 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1971).
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procedure more fair. 3 The Court even interpreted Wade as suggest-
ing it would best serve the interests of justice if the defense counsel
were provided with "the names of the witnesses who would attend;
the time, place and nature of the crimes involved; and the descrip-
tions of the suspect, if any, which the witnesses had given to the
police.""4 Since the reason for the presence of counsel at identifica-
tions is limited to his observation of the proceedings, some courts
will not condone defense counsel's attempt to use the lineup as a
discovery device by talking with the witnesses after the confronta-
tion. 5
At a minimum, Wade insures that a defense counsel can attempt
to ascertain the type of procedure to be employed by the police. He
may make suggestions, but cannot obstruct the proceedings. The
law in this area does not preclude counsel from trying to help ar-
range"1 or at least preview an identification procedure in which his
client will take part. Given the right to counsel articulated in Wade,
it appears counsel would be remiss if he failed to make any per-
ceived objections.
Some courts are also sensitive to potential prejudice stemming
from communication among witnesses during the identification 9
Accordingly, the law enforcement authorities should assure that
witnesses are instructed not to communicate among themselves;
additionally, witnesses should be affirmatively informed that the
purpose of the identification procedure is as much exoneration as
implication. Moreover, the government seems to have the burden of
insuring that witnesses have no opportunity to communicate and
93. See United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
94. Id. at 1289; Spriggs v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970). See also United
States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975) (counsel not
entitled to monitor police-witness interviews after lineups); United States v. Daniels, 506
F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967 (1975) (although a better practice, it is
not constitutionally required that counsel be shown marked ballots of witnesses at lineup);
United States v. Gholston, 437 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1971) (counsel's only function is to observe).
But see Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
96. In United States v. Holsey, 437 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1970), an identification was admis-
sible where the defendant obstructed proceedings by failing to cooperate. The resulting proce-
dure became "suggestive" because defendant refused to wear the style of clothes worn by the
other participants, and refused to dye his hair back to the color it was at the time of the crime.
97. Several possibilities are (1) to request the authorities to hold the first lineup without
the accused, (2) to have all participants do and say the same things, and (3) to be sure two
or more suspects are separated and placed in other lineups.
98. Objections made in writing to the officer in charge foreclose the possibility of varying
memories as do photographs taken of the proceedings by defense counsel.
99. See e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d
1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969). As to the danger of prejudice, see Monteiro v. Picard, 443 F.2d 311
(1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
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that the officers in charge devise a system whereby the witnesses can
ask questions or make remarks through them without attracting the
other witnesses' attention. 00 Although some courts dislike the prac-
tice of defense counsel interviewing the witnesses after the lineup,'0 '
defense attorneys are not automatically barred from doing so. Fi-
nally, there is state court authority for the proposition that the
defendant has the right to counsel immediately after an identifica-
tion is made.' 2
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REGULATION REGARDING THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
Wade specifically noted that the adoption of adequate legislation
or regulations eliminating the risk of abuse and unintentional
suggestion might be sufficient to prevent a finding that identifica-
tion is a critical stage.'0 3 The limited number of cases that specifi-
cally discuss police department rules indicate that few comprehen-
sive regulations have been implemented. The impact of Wade and
Gilbert on the authorities' conduct of identification procedures is
apparently confined to grudging compliance with the right to have
counsel present when required.
One sign of this resistance is manifested in the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.104 Section 3502 of that Act
states:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or
participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused
is being tried shall be admissible in evidence in any trial court
ordained and established under article I of the Constitution of
the United States.' 5
Although the words are clearly intended to oveitule the 1967 trilogy
by legislative fiat, no court has directly confronted the constitution-
ality of the provision." Courts prefer to interpret it as a limitation
on the supervisory power of the courts in other than constitutional
100. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842
(1970).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970).
102. See People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971).
103. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967). See United States v. Kirby, 427
F.2d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (if there are adequate regulations it is proper to withhold
judicial intervention).
104. Pub. L. 90-351, tit. II, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 42, 47
U.S.C.).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
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areas,' 7 an interpretation which makes the provision less meaning-
ful.
This section constitutes the only real federal legislative attempt
to regulate identification procedures; most of the current regulation
is judicially mandated. One approved practice involves sending a
court order to the accused and his counsel, together with a state-
ment that substitute counsel will be provided in the event that
retained counsel is not available. 0 Courts also favor the use of
photographs of the lineup to insure adequate review of the proce-
dure.'10 However, most discussions of identification regulations
merely describe the various pitfalls of lineup procedures and suggest
possible corrective measures."10 To sufficiently comply with Wade,
regulations should do more than suggest: they should either control
the manner in which the lineup is conducted or require extraordi-
nary devices such as the presence of an impartial magistrate or the
implementation of electronic procedures like audio and video moni-
toring.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a),"' once the ac-
cused is arrested he must be brought before a magistrate without
unnecessary delay. The reasons for prompt presentment, in accord-
ance with the McNabb-Mallory rule, involve the necessity that the
accused be warned of his rights to allow him to obtain counsel at
the earliest possible time and to give him a chance to exonerate
himself rather than remain in custody without probable cause. 112
Before counsel was deemed an essential element of identification
proceedings, the courts uniformly held that a delay in presentment
to a magistrate in order to hold a lineup was not a violation of rule
5(a)." 3
There is authority that a delay must be analyzed under a Stovall
standard, i.e., all circumstances of the particular case must be as-
sessed, to decide whether rule 5(a) requires suppression of the iden-
107. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 352 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d
785 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. King, 321 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (a photograph of a
lineup at which counsel was present can be shown to other witnesses as if counsel was present
at such subsequent viewing); United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Hinkle, 448 F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
ill. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (a).
112. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
113. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Kennedy v.
United States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Copeland v. United States, 343 F.2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Fredricksen v. United States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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tification testimony."' The better view is that of Judge Wright"5
and Chief Justice Burger (while on the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals)"' that rule 5(a) requires the exclusion of any identifica-
tion evidence stemming from an unnecessary delay."7 In any event,
it is apparent that the McNabb-Mallory rule is only a general policy
of excluding evidence gathered during a period of detention upon an
unlawful arrest.'" Since the unnecessary delay would render the
detention unlawful, there is no reason not to exclude the identifica-
tion evidence.
SUMMARY
The right to counsel during identification, guaranteed by the 1967
Supreme Court trilogy, was severely limited by Kirby v. Illinois"9
and is threatened by extensive use of substitute counsel. Still, the
basic rules, spirit, and sanctions of Wade and Gilbert have emerged
mostly intact from appellate review which generally has been hostile
to defendants with regard to identification procedures. Two prob-
lem areas are the harmless error' 20 and the independent basis
rules, 2 1 to be discussed at greater length in the next section. The
aforementioned hostility is eloquently expressed in interpretations
of Stovall requirements, to which the focus now turns.
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
The second guarantee to a defendant undergoing identification
procedures, articulated in Stovall v. Denno, '22 is that the procedures
must be administered in an unbiased manner in order to guard
against mistaken identifications. This guarantee has suffered badly
by virtue of both lower court and Supreme Court decisions.
114. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The applicability of
rule 5(a) may turn on the same consideration which Stovall was based on, namely, exigency.
Wise v. United States, 383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968).
115. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part).
116. See Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Burger, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
117. Accord, United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 922 (1968) (unnecessary delay could be grounds for exclusion but only two hours delay
here). But see Warner v. Howard, 416 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
119. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
120. See notes 29, 31 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 29, 35 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
122. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for iden-
tification procedures, its recent attentions have focused on the
abuse of such procedures. To deny an accused the benefit of a pre-
trial lineup, the most preferred procedure,2 3 as a matter of right,2 1
is held not to be an abuse of discretion; nor is it considered prejudi-
cial to omit a pre-trial lineup.2 5 A defense request for a lineup is
subject to the discretion of the court, which will weigh several fac-
tors: the length of time between the crime or arrest and the trial,
the possibility the defendant may have altered his or her appear-
ance, the extent of inconvenience to the prosecution witnesses, the
possibility that revealing the prosecution witnesses may subject
them to intimidation, the propriety of other identification proce-
dures, and the degree of doubt concerning the identification. '2 As a
moment's reflection might indicate, it is extremely difficult for a
defendant to prove abuse of discretion in this area. 7'
Just as one is not per se entitled to a lineup, an accused generally
has no right to a second lineup when one has already been pro-
vided.'28 Though no court requires that a lineup be held, many
courts have expressed the belief that it is a proper procedure29
which should be timely, well coordinated,' 31 and fair.' 31
When the converse is true, and the defendant does not wish to
participate in a lineup or other identification procedure, he has no
123. See note 9 supra.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. White,
482 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 949 (1974); United States v. Hurt, 476
F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 449 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971); United States
v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); Rutherford v. Deegan,
406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 983 (1969).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill,
449 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1971).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970); United States v. Estremera, 531 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 979 (1976)
(no abuse to deny request shortly before trial and two years after offense where witnesses had
viewed photo display six days after offense and persons in photographs looked sufficiently
similar). But see United States v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (abuse found,
conviction reversed, and indictment dismissed due to futility of holding lineup on a remand
where only eyewitnesses failed to identify defendant at lineup held several weeks after offen-
ses under less than ideal circumstances).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
128. See, e.g., United States v. King, 461 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also United States
v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975); United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931
(1972). See also note 4 supra.
130. See, e.g., United States v. King, 461 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
131. See notes 151 & 152 infra and accompanying text.
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right to avoid confrontation with his accusers after charges have
been filed.'32 If a defendant is involuntarily available for an identifi-
cation procedure solely because of an illegal arrest and he is thereby
identified, any testimony regarding that identification must be ex-
cluded. 33 However, the evidence will be inadmissible only if the
court finds a nexus between the illegal arrest and the defendant's
availablity. 34 Forcing a defendant into such a procedure may also
result in civil liability when the underlying arrest has no basis.'35
An incarcerated person must not only participate in a lineup
which relates to the offense with which he is charged,' 3 he may also
be forced to take part in identification procedures for other offen-
ses.' 7 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied a lineup partici-
pant's claims of due process and equal protection violations when
he argued that persons out on bail would not have been required to
participate in such a lineup."'
A citizen who is not suspected of criminal activity has the right
to refuse to participate in a lineup. However, since subtle pressures
may cause an innocent citizen to feel a refusal implies guilt, at least
one district court has set forth stringent requirements which are
necessary to show the consent was an intentional relinquishment of
a known right.' 3 That court, in a civil rights action for damages and
injunctive relief, granted an injunction on behalf of all the citizens
of Philadelphia which prevents the Philadelphia Police Department
132. A court order requiring the presence of a defendant in a lineup is neither a denial of
due process nor of the right against self-incrimination. United States v. Hammond, 419 F.2d
166 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1068 (1970). Accord, United States v. Kirby, 427
F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
133. See, e.g., Burbank v. Warden, Ill. St. Pen., 404 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). See also
United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). But see United States v. Kilgen, 445
F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) (good faith sufficient ground to admit resulting identification testi-
mony into evidence); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
134. See, e.g., Burbank v. Warden, Ill. St. Pen., 404 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); Stevenson
v. Wisconsin, 392 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Wis. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 954 (1976).
135. Grounds might exist for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 analogous to
Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
136. See, e.g., Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975
(1966).
137. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Jones, 403 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969); Adams v.
United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Burger, J., concurring), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1067 (1969). But see New Jersey v. Foy, 369 A.2d 995 (N.J. Super. 1976).
138. See, e.g., Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975
(1966). But see New Jersey v. Foy, 369 A.2d 995 (N.J. Super. 1976).
139. Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
[Vol. 9
Laywitness Indentifications
from conducting lineups in which citizen "fill-ins" participate un-
less
such citizen 'fill-ins' execute a written form certifying that they are
aware that there are no charges against them, that they have not
been arrested and they are under no compulsion whatever to par-
ticipate in the lineup, that they realize that they are legally free
to leave at any time, and that, if they are minors, they have con-
sulted with a parent or guardian and there is no objection from
such person to their participation in the lineup. 10
The Stovall Standards
In Stovall v. Denno, " the United States Supreme Court articu-
lated the due process standards applicable to cases not covered by
the personal confrontations umbrella of Wade and Gilbert. Those
standards consist of inquiring whether, considering all the attend-
ant circumstances, the identification procedure utilized was so un-
necessarily suggestive as to give rise to an irreparable mistaken
identification. 142
Stovall was clearly intended to encompass more situations-and
those more severely harmful to individual rights-than Wade and
Gilbert. The Stovall standards apply to all identification procedures
rather than just the personal confrontations addressed in Wade and
Gilbert."' In light of the Kirby case, the Stovall test is the only bar
to the admissibility of identifications made prior to the commence-
ment of formal proceedings against an accused."' When confronta-
tion and identification takes place subsequent to the commence-
ment of formal proceedings and after June 12, 1967, the Wade and
Gilbert standards and Stoval's due process standard are all applic-
able to personal identifications at trial.
Problems with Suggestive Procedures
Stovall violations have been considered by many courts. A clear
and extreme example was provided in the Supreme Court case of
140. Id. at 904.
141. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
142. Id. But see Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).
143. See, e.g., United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977) (voice examplar); United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975) (photo);
United States v. Jones, 512 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1975) (photo); United States v. McBride, 499
F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (photo); United States v. Burke, 496 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (photo).
144. See, e.g., Felix v. Cardwell, 404 F. Supp. 165 (D. Ariz. 1975), appeal dismissed, 545
F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977); Burbank v. Warden, Ill. St. Pen.,
404 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); Martin v. Donnelly, 391 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1974).
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Foster v. California.'45 An eyewitness testified at trial that he ob-
served the accused at the first police lineup and that that individual
stood out from the other two men in the lineup, because: (1) he was
close to six feet tall while the other two men were about six inches
shorter;" 6 and (2) he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that
worn by the robber. "7 When positive identification did not result
from the lineup, the police permitted a one-to-one confrontation
upon the witness' request to speak to the accused. "' Definite identi-
145. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
146. As to height discrepancies, see, e.g., United States v. Green, 526 F.2d 212 (8th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Pella v. Reid, 527 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1975). Age discrepancies are
not necessarily impermissibly suggestive either. See, e.g, Conner v. Deramus, 374 F. Supp.
504 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Nor are variant hairstyles. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 509 F.2d
499 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
147. Where the item of clothing at issue is central to the description, the fact that only
defendant is wearing such an item can render an identification inadmissible. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Cannon v. Smith, 527 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1975); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370
(7th Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1973). Where the
authorities conducting the identification procedure are not made aware of the centrality of
the item to that description, testimony as to an identification of the only person wearing the
item in a photo display may be admissible. United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.
1977). But see Ortiz v. Sielaff, 404 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.
1976).
It is not improper to have all the persons in an identification procedure, or all those the
witness has chosen as looking like the offender, wear incriminating clothing. See, e.g., Rudd
v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
148. One-person showups are generally condemned. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d
397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 IJ.S. 1016 (1975); Holland v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975). No per se exclusionary rule exists, however, regarding such
showups. Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974).
Showups are to be viewed suspiciously since they create the impression that police have
reason to believe the person presented is guilty of the offense. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). Though the potential for such an impression
would appear to be particularly strong where police show a witness a suspect, usually in
manacles, at or near the scene of a crime immediately or shortly after the offense, courts have
made an exception in such situations. See, e.g., United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d
48 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974); Richardson v. Rundle, 382 F. Supp. 633
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975). The courts
apparently feel the benefits to both defendants and law enforcement officials of immediate
elimination of innocent persons outweighs the inherent suggestiveness in such situations. See,
e.g., Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d 1075
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McCoy, 475 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Spencer v. Turner,
468 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 988 (1973); United States v. Howard,
426 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). The suggestiveness of in-court identifications of a defen-
dant at the defense table is justified on similarly "realistic" grounds. See, e.g., United States
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). One person showups are also generally excused
where the court perceives the witness has an independent basis for the identification. Holland
v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975); Heltzel v. Cowan, 518 F.2d
85 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975); United States v. McGhee, 488 F.2d 781 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 971 (1974); Stroud v. Hall, 386 F. Supp. 24 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd,
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fication of the accused occurred only after a second lineup was held
a week or ten days later, where the accused was the only participant
who had appeared in both lineups.'4 '
Stovall clarified that anyone subjected to an identification proce-
dure has a due process right to a fair proceeding. The courts have
uniformly stated, however, that a lineup need not be conducted
under laboratory conditions"0 and that the police are to be given
wide latitude in fashioning what they consider a fair lineup.15
Apparently, many courts limit their function, except in extreme
cases, to merely scolding and cautioning the police 2 rather than
searching affirmatively for ways to insure against mistaken identifi-
cations. For example, any lineup should be photographed as a basic,
preliminary requirement. Counsel for the defendant and the state
would thereby be assisted in preparation for the identification issue,
the finder of fact could examine the makeup of the lineup indepen-
dent of counsels' contentions and verify the testimony concerning
the lineup, and the appellate courts could more fully and ade-
511 F.2d 1100 (1st Cir. 1975); Flaherty v. Vinzant, 386 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Mass. 1974). But
see Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976). Basis for holding a one-person showup
is not provided by the smallness of a community, Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1974), or a tentative photographic identification of a
defendant already in custody, Dixon v. Hopper, 407 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
One-photo displays may be justified on independent basis grounds. See, e.g., Government
of Virgin Islands v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1977); Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d
1382 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jennings, 528 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Porter, 430 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243
(1977). Such photo displays are strongly disapproved by many courts. See, e.g., Israel v.
Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Barnes, 416 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D.N.Y. 1976). At least one court, in fact,
deemed showing witnesses, prior to identification, a newspaper photo of defendants' labelled
as suspects as not impermissibly suggestive. United States v. Henderson, 489 F.2d 802 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974). Another court interpreted a witness' observing
a photograph of defendant, together with other items within a clear plastic bag on an inter-
viewing detective's desk prior to a lineup, as presenting no problem. Government of Canal
Zone v. Green C., 521 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975).
149. That a defendant is the only person appearing in two or more identification displays
is normally considered suggestive, United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
unless the first display results in a positive identification and the second is merely cumula-
tive. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 528 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Hatrak,
417 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837
(1976) (a reasonable effort to harmonize a lineup is normally all that is required); United
States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1975).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837
(1976); United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Sanchell v. Parratt, 530
F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976) (a lineup must consist of "fillers" as well as the police suspects).
152. See, e.g., Pella v. Reid, 527 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1975); Government of Virgin Islands v.
Francis, 507 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
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quately review claims of suggestiveness. Yet, courts have stated only
their "preference" that lineups be photographed, and have not re-
quired it.'13
The courts have addressed several situations in which
"suggestiveness" may present problems. Obviously, an explicit
statement that the police suspect the person being shown to a wit-
ness is improper.' 4 It is equally impermissible for authorities to
inform a witness he or she has chosen the "wrong" person.'5 5 Telling
the witness to "take time" in examining the persons in the lineup
is allowable prior to the lineup, but not after an identification has
been made and retracted.' 8 Courts differ on whether it is illegally
suggestive to inform witnesses that one or more suspects are among
the persons in the lineup.'57 Courts are exceedingly lenient about a
witness' pre-trial failure to identify the defendant' '8 or a mistaken
identification' 9 when the witness had an unfettered opportunity to
previously view the defendant at the scene of the crime. Conducting
an identification procedure with more than one witness present is
disapproved' 0 but is not necessarily prohibited.'"' Allowing them to
converse about their identifications or the persons to be identified,
however, may be impermissible.' 2 On the other hand, it is clearly
153. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 462 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043
(1972); United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976) (but not fatal to
identification where made prior to statement and independently based). Statements made
to witnesses, prior to identification, that suspects exist, hazards the integrity of the proce-
dure. United States v. Allen, 497 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035 (1974).
155. An extreme case of this suggestiveness occurred in Texas where a prosecutor's trial
conduct rendered a witness's pre-trial photographic identification of defendant incapable of
saving the witness's in-court identification. Taylor v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1975).
The prosecutor not only informed the witness his lineup identification had been incorrect and
directed attention to the defendant, but also argued to the jury that the lineup error was
understandable, since six black men in a lineup look like "six black crows on a limb." Id. at
328. See also United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976).
156. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Francis, 507 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1975).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Person, 478 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v.
Barnes, 416 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Dobson, 512 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. O'Neal,
496 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1974); Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1974); McNeary v. Stone,
482 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973); Gilliard v. LaVallee, 376 F.
Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
160. See, e.g., Smith v. Redman, 414 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1976).
161. See, e.g., Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064
(1977); United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Wainwright, 523
F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); Monteiro v. Picard, 443 F.2d 311
(1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
162. See, e.g., Martin v. Donnelly, 391 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1974). But see Clark v.
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proper to show witnesses a photograph taken at the scene of the
offense prior to making an identification."3 Discrepancies between
features of defendants and the other persons displayed or.shown in
identification procedures as to clothing,"4 hair and hairstyle,"'6
build 6 and other factors are analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
An important consideration in this area is whether any potential
suggestiveness stems from conduct by the police.'67 Of course, even
in the absence of police misconduct, a faulty identification proce-
dure can occur.' Courts are more willing to find a Stovall violation
if the law enforcement officials have instigated the suggestiveness, 9
although if a witness resists police efforts to suggest a particular
person, courts may find no realistic possibility of misidentification
at trial.17 0 Since suggestive identifications not originating from law
enforcement officials are less likely to be found inadmissible, 7' the
extent of procedural protections afforded a defendant in such cir-
cumstances will relate to whatever cross-examination occurs. Thor-
ough cross-examination and jury instructions concerning the identi-
fication procedures may cure the problem of suggestiveness. 7 '
Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); United States v.
Rodriguez, 363 F. Supp. 499 (D.P.R. 1973).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgefourth, 538 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Irby, 517 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); Caver v. Alabama,
537 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1973); Rudd
v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); Ortiz v. Sielaff, 404 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
aff'd, 542 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1976).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Jackson, 509 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
167. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
168. See, e.g., Mock v. Rose, 472 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971
(1973); United States v. Johnson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924
(1972). See also note 170 infra.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976) (impermissibly
suggestive for witness to be shown defendant in handcuffs in non-emergency situation); Rudd
v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973) (impermissibly suggestive to show defendant to
witness before identification while defendant seated between two policemen in State's Attor-
ney's office). But see United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1973) for approval of
showing defendant in handcuffs at crime scene.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423
U.S. 987 (1975) (witness refused to identify defendant's photograph even though repeatedly
displayed and witness informed by police that others had identified defendant). See also
United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
936 (1975); United States v. Henderson, 489 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
913 (1974).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Samu-
els, 374 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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Hence, an effective defense counsel can defeat the issue with compe-
tent advocacy. The standards for suggestiveness are considered dif-
ferent in jury and bench trials. 17 3
Stovall v. Denno supplied the standards for judging due process
challenges in photographic identification procedures. 7 ' As with per-
sonal confrontation procedures, subtle suggestiveness normally does
not weigh heavily with the appellate courts. 7 5 One-photo displays,
while not per se unconstitutional,'76 usually are considered imper-
missibly suggestive in non-emergency situations.'77 On the other
hand, no court requires a particular number of photographs.78
While it may be considered markedly suggestive for a defendant's
picture to be the only one repeated in two or more photo displays, 7'
some courts have held otherwise.""
173. See, e.g., Smith v. Paderick, 519 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935
(1975).
174. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). See also United States v. Gidley, 527
F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 (1976); United States v. Ochoa, 543 F.2d 564
(5th Cir. 1976) for examples of the application of Stovall. But see Manson v. Brathwaite, 97
S. Ct. 2243 (1977), for a severe watering down of the application of Stovall.
Contrary to the view of the Court in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), a photo
display has more tendency, not less, to be subject to abuse since the accused is not present
to relay what limited impressions might be gathered from his presence. See id. at 337
(Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 496 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966
(1974) (not impermissibly suggestive to show one picture of the defendant and two pictures
of other subjects in display); United States v. Lincoln, 494 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1974) (not
suggestive that defendant's picture in color and other subjects are in black and white where
nine photos shown to witness).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976); Nassar v.
Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1975).
177. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977); Government of Virgin Islands
v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1977); Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kimbrough,
528 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1975); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975);
Gonzales v. Zelker, 477 F.2d 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); John v. Casscles
489 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). See also United States v. Burse,
531 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Porter, 430 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). But
see Smith v. Estelle, 531 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1976) (one-photo display a few days after multiple-
photo display not impermissibly suggestive); United States v. Anderson, 484 F.2d 746 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974) (one-photo display not impermissibly suggestive
where not for purpose of identification but just to ascertain name); United States v. Baxter,
492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940
(1974) (showing one photo in context of showing several hundred over period of time is not
impermissibly suggestive).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 456 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1972).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 528 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975); Moss v. Wolff, 505
F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 933 (1975); United States v. Cooper, 472 F.2d
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Though courts profess to prefer personal confrontations to photo-
grahic identification procedures,'"' they often reject arguments of
suggestive photograph procedures, stating that the type of proce-
dure utilized is irrelevant to the inquiry.' 2 Indeed, inasmuch as a
non-objectionable photographic identification has been held to vi-
tiate the taint of a suggestive personal confrontation,' 3 this alleged
"preference" is questionable."'"
Blatantly suggestive photographic identification procedures are
impermissible. This is true in situations relating to the features of
those pictured,'85 distinguishing and suggestive markings and nota-
64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). But see Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470 (8th
Cir. 1973).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 841 (1976); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
841 (1976). See also United States v. Bowie, 515 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Allen,
497 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035 (1974) and 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); United
States v. Valdivia, 492 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 512 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pigg,
471 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d
882 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Conner v. Deramus, 374 F. Supp. 504
(M.D. Pa. 1974).
184. The Supreme Court has been particularly lenient with regard to photographic identi-
fication procedures-which seems an unusual method of inducing police to utilize personal
confrontation procedures instead. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977); United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
841 (1976); United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (display impermissibly
suggestive where only the defendant had facial hair comparable to descriptions and defendant
was only heavyset person and tallest of subjects); Hogan v. Paderick, 399 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (display impermissibly suggestive where defendant was only black male and only
subject with scar and goatee in display of 11 white males, five black females and one black
male); Haberstroh v. Montanye, 362 F. Supp. 838 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 483 (2d
Cir. 1974) (display impermissibly suggestive since only defendant resembled description of
robber). But see United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977) (though a marked
difference between defendant's and other subjects' hair, not impermissibly suggestive where
defendant had close cropped hair and witness stated the offender had long, shoulder-length
hair which was probably a wig); United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975) (not impermissibly suggestive although none of the subjects
resembled defendant, inasmuch as each was a male Caucasian of the same general age and
had similar complexion and hair); United States v. Porter, 430 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1977)
(not impermissibly suggestive that witness recalled defendant was of slighter build than other
subjects); United States v. Getz, 381 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975) (though defendant one with disheveled hair and co-
defendant only mulatto, not impermissibly suggestive where 10 subjects otherwise similar);
United States v. Bostic, 360 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub nor. Appeal of Bradby,
491 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1973) and 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974)
(though subjects of different complexions, not impermissibly suggestive where all subjects
generally fit description and each shade of complexion was represented by at least two
subjects). The distinctiveness of a defendant's face can even vitiate suggestiveness where a
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tions on the face of the photographs,' 6 and police communications
with the witness.8 7 Suggestiveness which is considered impermissi-
ble by the courts may even originate from sources other than police
conduct. 8 Regardless of the form of suggestion, unless the defen-
dant is able to specify the prejudice with thoroughness and detail
and have such objections preserved on the record, he will be unable
to gain useful judicial review of his due process claim. 8 '
Voice identifications can also be unduly suggestive. However,
most of the decisions in this area have not found illegal suggestive-
ness. Marked speech characteristics are the normal focus of such
witness's recollection of the distinctive features could not have derived from observing the
photo display. United States v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 921
(3d Cir. 1974) and 497 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1974).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1976) (impermissibly
suggestive that all subjects but defendants were pictured in typical black and white "mug
shots" with police markings while defendants' pictures were in color without markings);
Crump v. Riddle, 408 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Va. 1976) (impermissibly suggestive that defen-
dant's picture bore date of crime); Johnson v. Hatrak, 417 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976) (imper-
missibly suggestive where only defendant's picture bore the legend "Rob." in photo display
regarding robbery). Compare, United States v. McBride, 499 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (not
impermissibly suggestive that witness found defendant's name in back of book containing
defendant's picture where witness immediately recognized assailant upon viewing defen-
dant); Frederick v. Reshetylo, 363 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (not impermissibly sugges-
tive that defendant's picture was dated the day before the display whereas other subject's
pictures were dated two years or more previous to the display); Clemmer v. Mazurkiewicz,
365 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1396, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974)
(marks on subjects' photo indicating prior involvement with the law not impermissibly
suggestive where witness testified she did not notice the marks). As to this latter case, one
must wonder as to the reliability of a witness who did not notice such marks.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 497 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035
(1974) and 419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (impermissibly suggestive that police tell witness they have
a suspect in custody). See also United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976)
(impermissibly suggestive for police to tell witness they believed defendant was the robber);
Ghiz v. Bordenkircher, 519 F.2d 759 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 924 (1976) (same);
Robinson v. Vincent, 371 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 969 (1975). But see United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(not impermissibly suggestive that witness was advised of defendant's recent release from
prison prior to viewing random selection of slides after tentatively identifying defendant);
United States v. Caulton, 498 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 898 (1974) (not
impermissibly suggestive that witness failed to identify defendant from photo display where-
upon police officer left and was observed by witness passing by door with defendant, who
witness immediately identified upon officer's return).
188. See, e.g., Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973) (impermissibly suggestive that son of dazed and injured witness took witness to police
station, informed witness of his own identification of defendant and essentially chose defen-
dant's picture for the witness). But see, e.g., United States v. Grose, 525 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976) (newspaper photo of robber viewed by witness before
identification did not taint identification).
189. See United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 949 (1975)
(counsel's mere allegation of suggestiveness without more required only a judicial examina-
tion of the photos by the court as opposed to a hearing considering the suggestiveness).
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claims. 0 Other challenges have been based on police communica-
tions with the witness,'"' and on the fact that the voice sample
amounted to a one-person showup."12 Judicial reluctance to find
suggestiveness in aural identifications, together with the fact that
only fleeting familiarity with the offender's voice is required for
purposes of identification,'93 creates an even greater potential for
misidentification than with visual identifications.
Erosions of the Stovall Standard
A finding that an identification procedure is impermissibly
suggestive is merely the first step in a Stovall inquiry. Recent opin-
ions of the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers'94 and Manson v.
Brathwaite, 9 mandate that upon a finding of impermissible sugges-
tiveness, courts must then determine whether there is a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification; however, the Stovall
Court did not utilize this "substantial likelihood" standard at all.' 96
Obviously, this new standard renders all but the most glaring and
obtrusively suggestive identifications constitutionally proper. Neil
introduced a "totality of circumstances" test' 7 which allows courts
190. See, e.g., United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977) (marked racial speech characteristics not enough); United States v. Kopacsi,
488 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 987 (1974) (difference in accents not
suggestive where identification made prior to hearing voices even though witnesses did not
inform police of identification until after hearing voices); United States v. Otero-Hernandez,
418 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (different pronunciation by defendant of particular word
all right since identification not based on such pronunciation). See also United States v.
Dupree, 553 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1977).
191. See, e.g,, United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1099 (1977) (impermissibly suggestive to ask witness if he knew defendant and could
identify his voice prior to playing single voice sample which witness identified as defen-
dant's). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 79 (1977).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976) (identification of defendant by voice and general features while defendant talking to
other men outside courtroom not impermissibly suggestive); Goodyear v. Delaware Correc-
tional Center, 419 F. Supp. 93 (D. Del. 1976).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000
(1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d
143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 503
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1974) and 503 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).
See also United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)
(operator of recording machine need only testify to accuracy of machine by verifying that
conversations played in open court were ones recorded); United States v. Esposito, 423 F.
Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no hearing required to determine fairness of aural identification
procedures since opportunity to cross-examine at trial is sufficient).
194. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
195. Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
196. Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
197. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Loyola University Law Journal
to negate suggestiveness and its inherent dangers by consideration
of several factors. In this drastically expanded second phase of the
"due process" inquiry, courts may examine: (1) the opportunity of
the witness to view the criminal; (2) the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal; (3) the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the confrontation; (4) the length of time
between the crime and the suggestive identification; (5) the witness'
degree of attention at the crime scene and identification procedure;
(6) the witness' mistaken identification, failure to identify defen-
dant previously, or inability to identify without confronting the de-
fendant; and (7) the presence of corroborative evidence.'98 Though
an identification based upon an improperly suggestive procedure
must be excluded,' 9 an exception is made, if with reference to these
factors the prosecutor can show by clear and convincing evidence
that a subsequent in-court identification is based upon an indepen-
dent observation of the criminal at the scene2°0 and not upon the
suggestive procedure.
The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the scene
is the factor given the most weight by the courts. Since this oppor-
tunity must be sufficient, in combination with other factors, 20' to
198. See Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kimbrough,
528 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976); Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1976); Kirby v.
Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); Government of Virgin
Islands v. Navarro, 513 F.2d 11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975); Israel v. Odom,
521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975); Cannon v. Montanye, 486 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 962 (1974); United States v. Hurt, 476 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Tyrrell v. Jeffes,
420 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); Crump v. Riddle, 408 F.
Supp. 975 (W.D. Va. 1976); Jackson v. Smith, 406 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Robinson
v. Vincent, 371 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afJ'd, 506 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 969 (1975).
199. See, e.g., Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dailey,
524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975); Gonzales v. Zelker, 477 F.2d 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
924 (1973); Riley v. Hocker, 441 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1971). But some courts have merely
examined the record and found nothing to support a defendant's contention of taint by a
suggestive procedure, implying that they did not require such a burden to be satisfied by the
prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex ret. Robinson v. Vincent, 371 F. Supp.
409 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 506 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 969 (1975). Even so,
a witness' mere statement that no taint exists should not be deemed sufficient (see, e.g.,
United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975)) although such denials combined with
opportunities to observe may be deemed enough. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 495 F.2d
475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035 (1974).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Jackson, 509 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Crump v. Riddle, 408 F. Supp. 975 (W.D.
Va. 1976).
201. The opportunity factor is most often not by itself sufficient to satisfy the state's
burden. See, e.g., Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1976) (opportunity and lack
of delay); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976)
and 426 U.S. 922 (1976) (opportunity and corroborative testimony); United States v. Ochoa,
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overcome the assumption that an intervening suggestive procedure
has influenced the in-court identification, in theory it should be
more extensive than the "adequate opportunity" a witness must
have to observe the criminal in order to make any identification.2
Yet some cases have found independent identifications upon ascer-
taining the existence of just such a minimal opportunity. 31 In any
event, the absence of one of the factors is normally not fatal to a
finding of an independent basis. 04
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Manson v. Brathwaite2 °:
is an excellent illustration of the dangers of the independent basis
analysis and the manner in which it can almost completely elimi-
nate the protections contemplated by the Stovall Court in 1967.0
Despite a severely limited opportunity to view the offender2 7 and
543 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976) (opportunity, description, and certainty); United States v.
Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975) (opportunity and initial
certainty despite repeated showings of displays); United States v. Jewett, 520 F.2d 581 (1st
Cir. 1975) (opportunity, description, and absence of suggestiveness despite delay); United
States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1975) (opportunity, lack of delay and indistinctiveness
of suggestive photos); Holland v. Perini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934
(1975) (opportunity, lack of delay and certainty); United States v. Young, 529 F.2d 193 (4th
Cir. 1975) (opportunity and description); United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975) (opportunity, description, and corrobative aural identifica-
tion); United States v. Allen, 497 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035 (1974) and
419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (opportunity, certainty, and recall); Smiley v. LaVallee, 473 F.2d 682
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 952 (1973) (opportunity, description, denial of reliance on
suggestive procedure by witness and care of witness in making identifications); Burbank v.
Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary, 404 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. I1. 1975), rev 'd, 535 F.2d 361 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977) (opportunity and degree of attention). However,
some courts view opportunity alone to be sufficient to establish an independent basis. See,
e.g., United States v. Snow, 552 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1977); Ghiz v. Bordenkircher, 519 F.2d
759 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131
(2d Cir. 1974); Moss v. Wolff, 505 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 933 (1975);
United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United
States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Gordy, 425 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
202. The witness' opportunity to observe the criminal must at least be sufficient to believe
the witness can identify the criminal. See, e.g., Cannon v. Smith, 527 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1975);
Goodyear v. Delaware Correctional Center, 419 F. Supp. 93 (D. Del. 1976).
203. See, e.g., Hilleary v. Wallace, 519 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1975).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
979 (1975) (delay only one factor); United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1976) (failure
to identify does not necessarily bar testimony); Richardson v. Rundle, 382 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975) (failure to describe offender not fatal to indepen-
dent basis).
205. 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
206. Rather than repeat a detailed criticism of the alleged logic of the Manson Court, the
authors believe the reader would profit by examining the excellent dissenting opinion of
Justices Marshall and Brennan, which also reviews the demise of due process protections
occurring since 1967. See id. at 2255-64. (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
207. See id. at 2260-61 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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the witness' lack of attention which resulted in a vague and ex-
tremely general description, 00 the lack of delay between the crime
and the identification," 9 and the certainty of the witness convinced
the Manson Court to find admissible what the State characterized
as an unnecessary and suggestive one-photo display.2 0
Many of the inherent difficulties with suggestiveness might be
overcome if defendants were allowed to introduce expert testimony
at .trial to demonstrate the subjective problems associated with
eyewitness or earwitness identification testimony. However, most
such offers of proof are rejected by trial courts, thereby keeping this
information from the jury. Moreover, appellate courts generally do
not find these refusals to be an abuse of discretion."'
In any event, the independent basis doctrine is not the only poten-
tial means for approving suggestive identification procedures. When
a court considers the suggestiveness to be harmless error, this can
also constitute grounds for denying the claim. Frequently, harmless
error is found where the identification evidence is deemed to be
merely cumulative of other evidence' or where the suggestiveness
of the procedure is negated by other circumstances."' The harmless
error doctrine is one normally reserved for appellate court review
and must be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when
constitutional rights are involved, as they are here.'
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and lower courts have indicated their explicit
lack of receptivity to claims of unconstitutional suggestiveness in
recent years. Stovall v. Denno has not been overruled, perhaps be-
cause its now empty shell serves to present an appearance of fairness
until closer examination reveals otherwise. Although courts are still
willing to find impermissible suggestiveness, few courts fail to ad-
duce a reason to uphold convictions despite the fact that identifica-
208. See id. at 2261. See especially, id. at 2262 n. 12.
209. Id. at 2250. But see id. at 2261.
210. See id. at 2250.
211. See, e.g., Dyas v. United States, 21 Crim. L. Rptr. 2464 (D.C. Ct. App., July 25,
1977); United States v. Hulen, 21 Crim. L. Rptr. 2493 (U.S. Ct. of Mil. App., August 8, 1977);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974); United States v. Caulton, 498 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 898 (1974);
United States v. Counts, 417 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgefourth, 538 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1976); Ortiz v.
Sielaff, 404 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Il. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1976).
214. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440,
451-53 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) for an excellent discussion of this issue.
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tions involve substantial suggestiveness. Perhaps Stovall is looked
upon by the federal courts today as an error. if so, by now it is surely
a harmless error.

